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THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S RULE AGAINST
VOUCHING FOR CLIENTS: ADVOCACY
AND "THE MANNER THAT IS
THE MAN HIMSELF"
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
"Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal charac-
ter when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him
credible. We believe good men more fully and more
readily than others: this is true generally whatever the
question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is
impossible and opinions are divided .... It is not true,
as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that
the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contrib-
utes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary,
his character may almost be called the most effective
means of persuasion he possesses."
- Aristotle'
INTRODUCTION
There is an old argument in the American legal profession,
as there is in classical philosophy,2 and between lawyers and
teachers of ethics, over the morality of advocacy as a profes-
sion. The American argument is like the classical dispute
between rhetoric and philosophy, but it has a focus of its own,
in part because the practice of law is in America the exercise of
coercive power, and in part because American lawyers claim
responsibility for what they call the administration of justice.'
* B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Huber Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law,
Boston College, Fall 1992; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law,
University of Notre Dame; member of the Indiana Bar.
1. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 25 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library
ed. 1984) [hereinafter RHETORIC].
2. For descriptions of the classical philosophical discussions, see
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); and JAMES B.
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
3. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1
(1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE], which states: "A lawyer should assist in
maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession," and EC 1-
1 which states: "A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is
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Modem American lawyers impose on one another regula-
tory rules that speak to the old argument but have not resolved
it. One of these requires lawyers to advocate the interests of
their clients with zeal; another forbids them from arguing that
they believe what they say, or in the merit of what they are ask-
ing the government to do. The latter of these is a rule against
vouching for clients. Rules that require zeal and forbid vouch-
ing seek to prevent both advertent deceit and an "unprofes-
sional" limitation of advocacy to causes lawyers believe in. My
claim is that these rules are as unsatisfactory as the two evils
they attempt to prevent.
My proposal is to appropriate, instead of these rules, or as
a way to live with rules such as these, the understanding of
friendship Aristotle developed in his Ethics and in the Magna
Moralia.4 This paper is part of a broader argument for Aristo-
telian virtue ethics in American legal ethics. It is more specifi-
cally, and in reference to the moral judgments advocates make,
an argument for consideration of the virtue of friendship (or
friendliness), and against dependence on ethical analysis of the
statements hypothetical advocates make or might make.5
I will attempt to describe, first, the situation of a modern
American lawyer-advocate; then the history behind this situa-
tion, with attention to the fact that professional teaching on
vouching has turned on the misuse of character, rather than on
concern for truthfulness. Then I will attempt to survey appel-
that every person in our society should have ready access to the independent
professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining
the integrity and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest
standards is the ethical responsibility of every lawyer."
4. ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA (George Stock trans., 1915) (hereinafter
MAGNA MORALIA]; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Oswald trans.,
1962) [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS).
5. I depend on accounts of the virtue of friendship that usually refer to
and depend on what Aristotle says about it but that also relate it to the
theological virtue of love that is important - indeed primary - in the Jewish
and Christian religious tradition. See John M. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of
Friendship, 30 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 619 (1977); Eleanor H. Haney, What is
Feminist Ethics? A Proposal for Continuing Discussion, 8 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 115
(1980); Stanley Hauerwas, Companions on the Way: The Necessity of Friendship, 45
ASBURY THEOLOGICAL J. 35 (1990); Timothy P. Jackson, The Disconsolation of
Theology: Irony, Cruelty, and Putting Charity First, 20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 1
(1992); and Rose M. Volbrecht, Friendship: Mutual Apprenticeship in Moral
Development, 24 J. VALUE INQUIRY 301 (1990); see also C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR
LOVES (1960); GILBERT MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL
ETHICS (1981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS ch. 5 &
Epilogue (1987) [hereinafter FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS]; Stephen J. Pope,
Aquinas on Almsgiving: Justice and Charity. An Interpretation and Reassessment, 32
HEYTHROPJ. 167 (1991).
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late opinions from Canada and the United States, for indica-
tions on how we lawyers live with rules on zeal and vouching,
and how we use them offensively. And, finally, I will offer the
Aristotelian alternative and take a look at how it shows up in
the anthropology of American lawyers.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION OF AMERICAN
LAWYERS AS ADVOCATES
Richard Wasserstrom, lawyer and moral philosopher, in a
1975 essay that has become remarkably prominent, argued that
the operating morality of American lawyers will not survive
common-sense ethical analysis:
What is characteristic of [the] role of a lawyer is the law-
yer's required indifference to a wide variety of ends and
consequences that in other contexts would be of undeni-
able moral significance. Once a lawyer represents a cli-
ent, the lawyer has a duty to make his or her expertise
fully available in the realization of the end sought by the
client, irrespective, for the most part, of the moral worth
[of the end sought] or the character of the client....
[T]he lawyer is, in essence, an amoral technician whose
peculiar skills and knowledge . . . are available to those
with whom the relationship of client is established.6
Wasserstrom's critique was not directed at excesses. He
did not propose to draw a line, or to define a limit. He aimed
at the essence of the enterprise as modern American lawyers
have come to regard it. He spoke to what he saw as the inher-
ent quality of a professional way of life, as one might speak to
the inherent quality of the profession of soldiering by asking
whether it is moral to kill people in obedience to the state.
Wasserstrom's characterization of the operating morality of the
modern American profession was that a person is not a real
lawyer unless she is prepared to advocate an interest she would
otherwise find morally insupportable.
The late Abe Fortas, an eminent American lawyer and
judge, commenting on the career of his partner, Thurman
Arnold, an equally eminent lawyer, said to students at the Yale
Law School, a place of eminent lawyers:
Lawyers are agents . . . and they should neither criticize
nor tolerate criticism based upon the character of the cli-
ent whom they represent or the cause that they prosecute
6. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 5-6 (1975).
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or defend. They cannot and should not accept responsi-
bility for the client's practices. Rapists, murderers, child-
abusers, General Motors... cigarette manufacturers and
stream-polluters - are entitled to a lawyer; and any law-
yer who undertakes their representation must be immune
from criticism. ...
Justice Fortas's justification was a broad appeal to the
notion that lawyer professionalism is possible because lawyers
are agents. Wasserstrom would apparently agree with framing
the issue in those terms. Others have relied on the systemic
assurance that the state in its judicial robes will arrive at truth,
or provide justice, or both, and therefore lawyers need not
worry about the consequences of their advocacy. The argu-
ment is that advocates have a task within a system. The rele-
vant moral question is what the system does.' "Lawyers are not
judges" is the common phrase. 9
A. The Modern Situation Is a Recent Development
The professional ethic Wasserstrom described and Justice
Fortas defended is a recent development among American law-
yers. In the three generations of lawyers that fashioned, super-
vised, and implemented the American Revolution (1770-1860)
the dominant ethical teaching was that lawyers are responsible,
case by case, for truth and justice. Early nineteenth-century
American lawyers thus honored Cicero's maxim that only the
good person can speak well: An advocate's art does not suc-
ceed when it is used by a bad person, and a good person does
not argue for rules of law that would be bad for the commu-
nity.' Eminent American lawyers of a later time - even
through the generation that retired from practice in the 1980s
7. Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L.J.
988, 1002 (1970); see also Ted Schneyer, Getting from 'Is' to 'Ought' in Legal
Ethics, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903.
8. See Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH.
U. L. REV. 331 (1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36
CATH. U. L. REV. 319 (1987) [hereinafter Good Client]. These articles describe
this ethical position and compare it with an ethical position that rests instead
on the autonomy of the client.
9. Fortas can be taken to have invoked the systemic assurance, but I
doubt that he depended on it: Fortas and Arnold and their clients had seen
and heard, supported and suffered from, the depredations of modern nation-
states. Fortas knew better than to rely on any state, even his own, for justice.
See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS (1990).
10. See FISH, supra note 2, at 471-502.
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- argued that the legal profession is a school for virtue, a way
to become a better person.''
If an advocate nonetheless sought from the decision maker
a result that would not be good for the community, the sound-
ness of the decision maker was a corrective. American trial law-
yers still announce their respect for Cicero's proposition that
eloquence serves reason. Trial lawyers believe, of course, that
their techniques sway judges and juries; but when they attempt
to justify their work they say they trust judges and juries to be
rational; trial tactics succeed only when, in justice, they should
succeed. In political principle, they would no doubt take Cic-
ero's side of the classical argument between rhetoric and phi-
losophy, and disagree with Aristotle's observation that rhetoric
succeeds because of defects in those on whom it is practiced.' 2
If you took a survey of American trial lawyers - or attended for
several months to the contents of Trial magazine, the journal of
the American Trial Lawyers Association - you would notice
more support for Cicero's affirmation of the dependence of
rhetoric on reason than for Aristotle's belief that rhetoric
exploits defects in those who hear it.
I discern two Ciceronian notions in this development of
the ethics of advocacy among American lawyers. One has to do
with the effect of the advocate's character: Only the good per-
son can be an effective advocate. That notion, which would
11. Harry W. Jones, an elder statesman from the Columbia law faculty,
argued thus, and argued as well that lawyers provide moral guidance to their
clients:
If there is an external moral standard for the [legal] counselor, it is
S.. 'my client as his values would be if he had studied law." This is
not a quibble; . . . If I did not [believe it], I would have to conclude
that I had wasted my life in the study and teaching of law.
Harry W.Jones, Lawyers andJustice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 957, 973 (1978).
12. Aristotle believed that:
One great use of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of
intelligence in his hearers. . . . [O]ther things affect the result
considerably, owning to the defects of our hearers.... The aptness
of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of
your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be
trusted from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as
you describe them; and therefore they take your story to be true,
whether it is so or not .... You may use any means you choose to
make your hearer receptive; among others, giving him a good
impression of your character, which always helps to secure his
attention.... [A]ll of this has nothing to do with the speech itself. It
merely has to do with the weak-minded tendency of the hearer to
listen to what is beside the point.
RHETORIC, supra note 1, at 138, 165, 178, 203.
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accept that character persuades, and would probably therefore
not worry about vouching for clients, has become a thin and
poorly articulated sentiment in modem American legal
ethics. 13
The other notion - that eloquence serves reason - that
however apparently effective advocacy is, the decision maker
will not be swayed to an unjust result - has become an argu-
ment for the role morality of which Wasserstrom complained.
Vouching for clients is a problem for this argument, because it
corrupts decision making. One way to resolve the problem is
to trust the system to overcome the advocate's attempts to cor-
rupt it. If I infer well from Fortas (and Cicero), American advo-
cates occupy roles in a system that is to be trusted. It is as if we
were to have a formal dispute on whether the earth is flat. I
could, in good conscience, argue for the affirmative, though I
do not believe it. That would be to perform a useful service in
a formal dispute, which dispute is a useful thing to have. The
British Bar has traditionally regarded advocacy in this way:
Trial lawyers there originally travelled around with royal
judges, in provincial trials, and took sides as sides needed to be
taken. In Geoffrey Hazard's phrase, they were not so much
officers of the court as they were members of the court. 14 The
court itself (the judge) was taken to be as sound as the pound
sterling came to be.
The fact that lawyers are paid focuses the same problem in
another way: If advocacy is an amoral enterprise, as Wasser-
strom says, it should be available to all litigants, not only to
those who are wealthy. Making wealth necessary for obtaining
a mere agent is as objectionable as making wealth necessary for
obtaining the services of a judge. The British Bar therefore
cherishes the fiction that pay is incidental. One cultural model
for the trial lawyer in England has been the medieval champion
in an ordeal by battle. Champions were not allowed to take
pay. In the late twelfth century, one of them was caught
13. See supra notes 3 & 12. Aristotle also argued for character in
advocacy, but, at least in the RHETORIC, supra note 1, he did not so closely
connect the advocate's tactics with his character, and he did not depend at all
on the soundness of the decision maker.
14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1978). The nineteenth-century
appropriation of Cicero's defense of rhetoric fit the British setting better than
it fit advocacy by American lawyers of that time. The Americans were more
often than not identified with their clients, rather than with the court. I
develop that comparison in THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND
A LAWYER ch. 6 (1981) [hereinafter ON BEING A CHRISTIAN].
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accepting payment and his hands were chopped off. 5 In a later
era, the barrister's robe had a little pocket in the back, into
which the client could drop gold coins. The lawyer was sur-
prised, I suppose, when he hung the robe up and found money
in the pocket. 16
American lawyers have been rather more candid about
being paid by their clients. Legal fees are often the most seri-
ous consequence of being in legal trouble, and are a principal
administrative cost in the conduct of American business. When
you consider that American trial lawyers more candidly under-
stand themselves to be in the pay of their clients, you can per-
haps see how Cicero's defense of rhetoric is less persuasive in
America than it would be, or would have been, in Britain: Mak-
ing our services available for pay - being candid about that -
and at the same time claiming to be more concerned with ser-
vice than with fees - makes it more urgent for us to believe
that those we serve deserve our services - deserve them on
some basis other than their wealth.
A morality that appears to come closer to resolving Was-
serstrom's issue, at least among modern American politicians
and "public interest" advocates, for pleaders of good causes
and champions of social justice, is what Aristotle offered in the
Rhetoric: The advocate's art is neutral; the morality of advocacy
turns neither on its devices, nor on the effect of its devices, but
on the motives of those who use them: "What makes a man a
'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose." The unjust
use of the power of speech does great harm, but he said the
same is true of all good things except virtue. 17
15. 56 SELDEN SOCIETY, ROLLS OF THEJUSTICES IN EYRE FOR YORKSHIRE,
1218-19 (1937).
16. See generally R.E. MEGARRY, LAWYER AND LITIGANT IN ENGLAND 179-
201 (1962).
.'-! 17. RHETORIC, supra note 1, at 23-24. I do not mean to argue here that
taking pay for advocacy is in itself morally problematical; for those lawyers
who believe in the causes they advocate, who advocate morally admirable
causes and are paid for their pains, Aristotle's distinction between the moral
rhetorician and the immoral sophist seems applicable. It is as satisfying for a
paid advocate as it would be for a volunteer environmental lobbyist who
proves his sincerity by using paper cups. Harper Lee's Atticus Finch need
not, therefore, have worried that Maycomb County paid him for defending
Tom Robinson. Nor - on this point anyway - need the Wall Street
corporate lawyers of a century ago have worried about their narrow,
vehement, well-compensated service to corporate business: "[Tihey shared
the convictions of their clients," Mark DeWolfe Howe said of partners in the
Cravath firm. "[O]ne must give them credit for having played a creative role
with enthusiasm. To deny [them their] convictions is to drain ... character of
its integrity and convert... enthusiasm into cynicism." Mark D. Howe, Book
1993]
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The Aristotelian ethical analysis of moral purpose appears
to be the resolution of the question in American stories about
lawyers - Atticus Finch, pleading for the life of Tom Robin-
son, in Harper Lee's novel (and Horton Foote's screenplay), To
Kill a Mockingbird; Gavin Stevens working through the night for
the uppity Lucas Beauchamp, in Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust;
Andrew Hamilton, come out of dignified retirement to risk life
and limb to defend the rebellious colonial journalist, John
Peter Zenger. l a These lawyer-heroes are like Moses arguing
with God: Scripture and the Midrash describe how Moses used
an ingenious array of rhetorical devices to save the idolatrous
children of Israel from destruction. I" The American lawyer-
heroes believe in what they are doing; they have decided that
what they are doing is admirable; their art is in service to their
good motives.
The same might be said for the office work of lawyers -
advising clients, drafting documents, and negotiating the
arrangements on which business and government depend. In
these matters, which are most of what American lawyers do
(although they are minor in the folklore of the profession),
American lawyers are more willing to be moral leaders, to be
like pastoral counselors, than when, as advocates, they emulate
"Race Horse" Haynes or F. Lee Bailey. Some legal ethicists
thus argue that American lawyers, whatever the morality of
their trial work, should accept responsibility for the justice of
law-office planning and drafting.2 ° This was the argument in
the tradition of the republican lawyer-aristocrats, an argument
they applied to all of their work: They accepted the burdens of
moral leadership. 2'
But the resolution according to purpose has become prob-
lematical for an occupation that offers advocacy to all in the
community who think they need it, that claims and takes upon
Review, 60 HARV. L. REV. 838, 842 (1947) (reviewing ROBERT SWAINE, THE
CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947 (1946)). It is worth
noticing, nonetheless, that one of the ways a false prophet was identified in
the early centuries of Christianity was that she or he took pay for preaching.
18. FREE PRESS ANTHOLOGY (Theodore Schroeder ed., 1909).
19. See Exodus 32; III MIDRASH RABBAH ch. 43-44 (S.M. Lehrman trans.,
1983).
20. That is the burden of Jones's argument, supra note 11.
21. See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 76-87 (1991); DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF STUDY
(2d ed. 1836). Louis Auchincloss's Wall Street lawyers are often put into
moral tension on this issue. See HENRY KNOX, THE GREAT WORLD AND
TIMOTHY COLT; THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS ch. 6 & 7
(1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS].
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itself a public franchise as much as the electric company does.
"Profession," in this exclusive and occupational sense, means a
group of people who have, in association with one another,
undertaken to meet, in general, and entirely, some need in the
community that both individuals and the collective institutions
that speak for the community regard as important. In the Brit-
ish Bar this undertaking has been expressed by the metaphor of
the taxi-cab: A British trial lawyer is available to whomever is
next in line.22 Among American lawyers, who have been closer
to their clients than barristers are to theirs, the undertaking has
been collective: No one of us is professionally obliged to take
the next person in line,2" but we accept, together, the obliga-
tion to see to it that some lawyer does.2" The alternatives for
legal ethics, then, in meeting the demand for professional
advocacy as an enfranchised enterprise, seem to be to deny
advocacy to some citizens or to deny the advocate the ability to
follow her conscience.
B. Lawyers' Market Morality
The classical tension between rhetoric and philosophy
appears in American legal ethics as (i) the enduring Ciceronian
notion that the decision maker's sound reason will correct
excesses in advocacy, and therefore the advocate's role in the
system justifies what would otherwise appear as immoral
behavior for immoral ends; and (ii) the less enduring Aristote-
lian notion that advocacy is justified, not by the soundness of
the decision-maker, but by the advocate's motive and pur-
pose." On the one hand there is the public franchise argu-
ment and the adversary ethic's dependence on the state; and,
on the other, is the recurrent situation, found in stories about
American lawyers, in which the justice of the case rests, not in
the decision but in the advocate's goal: The goal even justifies
22. See MEGARRY, supra note 16, at 32-33.
23. See Freedman, supra note 8.
24. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-24 & 2-25. The code
makes the responsibility a personal one but gives as examples of admirable
responses collective efforts to provide lawyers for people who cannot pay for
them. A similar disposition obtains in Canada. See Walter F. Schroeder, Some
Ethical Problems in Criminal Law, L. Soc'y. U.C. LECT. 87 (1963): "Legal Aid
Associations in all the counties and districts of this province . . . function
satisfactorily in most areas and . . . receive the warmest encouragement and
support of the senior members of the profession." Id. at 99-100.
25. Professor Linda R. Hirshman, among many helpful suggestions,
points to a distinction in Aristotle's scheme between motive and purpose (or
goal or telos). That would be a fruitful distinction for further thought, but for
present purposes I am using the two interchangeably.
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what seem to be deceitful and abusive advocate's devices. 2 6
Consistent with the former side of this tension, American legal
professionalism has come to mean that advocates argue for
interests they do not believe in. The American profession,
especially in New York City, began in our Industrial Revolution
to give strident support to such advocates, as Justice Fortas was
strident in defense of his law partner Thurman Arnold. They
participated as much as the robber barons of industry did in
what Emile Durkheim called American market morality.27
Louis D. Brandeis, a "public interest" lawyer if there ever
was one, and an example of both sides of the tension, made
payment the determinative difference. He supported both his
family and his efforts for social reform from fees paid him by
corporate clients in Boston, whose interests he defended in
court and in law-office corporate work, and then opposed in the
Massachusetts legislature and in state and national politics.
When he took professional time to assist labor unions, working
women, and the children of immigrants, he charged these
"public interest" clients nothing and paid his partners for his
time.
Brandeis has had, in the distinction if not in scrupulous
fiscal adherence to the consequences of it, many emulators.
The legal-aid and pro-bono-publico movements, for example,
have been sustained and revived by partners from Wall Street
law firms. When legal aid became national policy, part of Presi-
dent Johnson's War on Poverty, it was significantly through the
uncompensated advocacy of Lewis F. Powell, then president of
the American Bar Association and a partner in Richmond's
largest law firm. (I infer that a lawyer working for nothing, or
working on behalf of lawyers working for nothing, attends, as
Brandeis did, to the moral purpose of his efforts - however he
feels about the moral purpose of clients who pay him). 28
26. See AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 21, at 350-61. This
application is what makes the Rhetoric a quizzical ethical document.
27. See Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The
Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
191 (1977); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic,
41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988) [hereinafter Unsound Adversary Ethic].
28. See John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 683 (1965), substantially reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
21, at 273-301. Brandeis did not focus on the autonomy of his client. See
supra text accompanying notes 18-19. He did not serve without pay so that
everyone could have a lawyer. He was an Aristotelian in his choice of "pro
bono" clients.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICA OF THE
LAWYER'S MARKET MORALITY
A. The Courvoisier Case
Brandeis, Wall Street law firms, and Justice Powell illus-
trate the question I mean to talk about, but the more flamboy-
ant and memorable examples are, of course, from criminal-
defense cases.29 The case that agitated nineteenth-century
American lawyers most in this respect was the defense in
London of a Swiss valet named Benjamin Francois Courvoisier,
who killed his employer, Lord William Russell, and stole Lord
Russell's jewelry. Courvoisier protested his innocence at first,
but during the trial he confessed the crime to his advocate, a
trial lawyer named Charles Phillips. The next day, after what
he admitted was a sleepless night, Mr. Phillips argued to the
jury, for three hours, that Courvoisier should be found not
guilty. 30
American critics of Phillips did not accuse him of repre-
senting a guilty man on a not-guilty plea. It was conceded,
among lawyers, then as it would be now, that the murderer was
entitled to require the Crown to prove his guilt. Phillips would
have been within his brief, as the British lawyers say it, to have
invoked the presumption of innocence and to have talked for
three hours, as Mr. Rumpole does, about weaknesses in the
Crown's evidence and the liberties guaranteed English people
in Magna Carta.
Phillips said, in a letter to the Times, nine years later, that
that was all he had done.3 ' His critics - and it was the critics
who got American lawyers going - said Phillips's jury speech
was a representation to the jurors that he believed his client
innocent. His was "an appeal to Heaven for its testimony to a
lie."-32 Phillips denied that he had appealed to Heaven; all he
used, he said, were "fair commentary on the evidence, though
undoubtedly as strong as I could make them."33 He said it was
his duty to make strong arguments.
29. American lawyers talking about ethics find it generally comfortable
to use criminal-defense quandaries, partly, I think, because so few of us work
in the criminal courts.
30. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973) describes
the case in detail.
31. Letter from Charles Phillips to Samuel Warren, THE TIMES
(London), Nov. 20, 1849, reprinted in George Sharswood, An Essay on
Professional Ethics, 32 REP. A.B.A. 183 app., at 187 (1884) (5th ed. 1907).
32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 189-90.
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"If I slumbered for a moment" during the night before he
made the jury speech, he said:
[T]he murderer's form arose before me, scaring sleep
away, now muttering his awful crime, and now shrieking
to me to save his life! ... I had no right to throw up my
brief, and turn traitor to the wretch, wretch though he
was, who had confided in me. The counsel for a prisoner
has no option. The moment he accepts his brief, every
faculty he possesses becomes his client's property. 4
He said he knew of "two illustrious advocates of our own day"
who had done so "even to the confronting of a king," and who
had been praised for their daring and thereafter "promoted,"
by monarch and profession, "to the highest dignities.""5
One of the "illustrious advocates" to whom Phillips
alluded was Lord Brougham, a Scots politician who had
defended Queen Caroline in the House of Lords against the
ugly designs of King George IV. Brougham succeeded and was
later made Lord Chancellor. Brougham gave to England and
America what has become, for emotional comfort and in official
proclamation, the ethic of the modern professional advocate:
An advocate.., knows but one person... and that per-
son is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons
... is his first and only duty.... [H]e must not regard the
alarm, the torments, the destruction he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on, reckless of consequences:
though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his coun-
try in confusion. 36
Brougham's hyperbole contributed to a debate in this country;
from the debate has come the adversary ethic, the modern
34. Id. at 192.
35. Id. at 193.
36. MELLINKOFF, supra note 30, at 189. The King had introduced a bill
for a legislative divorce in the House of Lords, so that he could keep the
Queen out of England. Brougham knew, but the country perhaps did not,
that the King was a philanderer who had attempted another marriage before
he married the Queen. Brougham's remote purpose was the defense of an
innocent lady; his proximate purpose was to warn the supporters of the King
that he had the goods on the King and that, if pressed, he would go public
with his evidence. I suspect that legal ethics was far from his mind, but what
he said, not what he was doing, caught the attention of American lawyers, as
did the critics' version of Phillips's behavior in the Courvoisier case. See
Unsound Adversary Ethic, supra note 27, at 204-06, 326-27.
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American lawyers' attempted resolution of the moral issue I am
attempting to describe.37
B. Vouching is Vouching, Even When It's Truthful
Until the debate among American and British lawyers, on
Phillips's jury speech for Courvoisier, the principal ethical
teaching among American lawyers had been that a lawyer who
pretends belief in his client's cause, when he does not believe
in it, is a liar. In 1854, the best known teacher of American
legal ethics, then and now, Judge George Sharswood of Penn-
sylvania, appropriated on this point the Elements of Moral and
Political Science of William Whewell: "[I]f in pleading he asserts
his belief that his cause is just when he believes it unjust, he
offends against truth, as any other man would do who in like
37. MELLINKOFF, supra note 30, at 189.
"Let me tell you, folks-I've been around long enough
to develop an instinct for these things, and my client is
innocent or Im very much mistaken."
Drawing by Handelsman; © 1985 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
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manner made a like assertion. ""8 And, in reference to the
Courvoisier case: "No right-minded man, professional or
otherwise, will contend that it would have been right in [Phil-
lips] ... to stand up and falsely pretend a confidence in the
truth and justice of his cause, which he did not feel." 9
Contemporary disapproval interpreted what Phillips did as
deceptive advocacy: It is a lie to pretend belief where one does
not have it. The issue was false use of character, which I will
attempt here to distinguish from misuse of character. Shar-
swood followed Whewell in treating the moral issue as one
involving deceit. They apparently would have approved by
implication the truthful vouching of Atticus Finch, Gavin Ste-
vens, Alexander Hamilton, and the public-interest lawyers who
tell jurors they believe their clients, but only when they do.
But American teachers of legal ethics in Canada and the
United States did not develop either their principles or their
rules around the virtue of truthfulness. They discouraged all
vouching for clients, honest as well as deceptive. Their appeal
has been grounded in values other than truthfulness. Their
moral reasoning comprehends both the vouching that, on
Sharswood's and Whewell's reasoning, is deceitful, and the
vouching that is not. Most of their arguments turn on conse-
quences for lawyers' careers - the careers both of the vouch-
ing advocate and of his colleagues - and for the state. For
example:
- A young lawyer or a lawyer who is a stranger in town,
who is not known to the judge and jurors, is at a disadvantage
when vouching for clients, because the vouching of older, bet-
ter-known lawyers carries more weight.
- Vouching invokes character; making an issue of charac-
ter among the lawyers in the case is a distraction from the
issues in the case. It wastes judicial time.4 °
38. Sharswood, supra note 31, at 101 (quoting WILLIAM WHEWELL,
ELEMENTS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1845)).
39. Id. at 105.
40. Hoffman's and Sharswood's reasoning, discussed just above,
comprehends both of these first two arguments. The Canadian Bar
Association's "Code of Professional Conduct" invokes the second in its
restatement of the rule against vouching: "The lawyer should not express
personal opinions or beliefs .... The lawyer must not . . .put the lawyer's
own credibility in issue." CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT ch. 9, para. 5 cmt. (1974).
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- If today I vouch for my client, and tomorrow have
another client for whom I do not vouch, the judge and jurors
will assume I do not believe the second client.4
- If a lawyer's speech asserts facts, including particularly
the fact that the lawyer believes another, controverted fact, the
government's process for sifting facts in evidence is evaded if
not frustrated.42
A generation before Sharswood lectured on legal ethics,
the grandfather of the discipline, David Hoffman of Baltimore,
argued that vouching is a misuse of character. Advocacy
should usually be separated from the character of the advocate:
"[I]nfluence .. . [is] the most valuable of my possessions, and
not [to] be cheapened, or rendered questionable by a too fre-
quent appeal .... If the case be a good one, it needs no such
appliance. ... ,,4s And if the case is not a good one, Hoffman
said, a lawyer should not argue it.4 4 A generation later, Shar-
swood, quoting Whewell, said:
If [the lawyer] mixes up his character as an adlvocate with
his character as a moral agent, using his moral influence
for the advocate's purpose, he acts immorally. He makes
the moral rule subordinate to the professional role. He
sells to his client not only his skill and learning but
himself.45
Hoffman was not arguing for role morality. His argument
was that vouching is too potent for an ordinary, Wednesday-
morning, county-seat lawsuit. He invoked not truthfulness -
he believed that in some cases, clients could be vouched for
truthfully - but prudence. He deliberated.in reference to a
fact; as Aristotle said, "We believe good men more fully and
more readily than others."46 And therefore, he and other nine-
teenth-century American legal ethicists said, the goodness of
41. See CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR ASS'N (1887), reprinted in
118 Ala. xxiii (1899): "If such assertions are habitually made they lose all
force and subject the attorney to falsehoods; while the failure to make them
in particular cases will often be esteemed a tacit admission of belief of the
client's guilt, or the weakness of his cause."
42. See United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1990): "Use of
the 'truthfulness' portions of these arguments becomes impermissible
vouching ... when the prosecutors explicitly or implicitly indicate that they
can monitor and accurately verify the truthfulness of the witness' testimony."
Id. at 1498.
43. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 757 (2nd ed. 1836).
44. Id.
45. See Sharswood, supra note 31, at 101.
46. RHETORIC, supra note 1, at 25.
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the advocate had to be taken out of advocacy. It is an undue
influence.
Hoffman in the 1830s, Sharswood in the 1850s, and Judge
Thomas Goode Jones of Alabama, author of the first code of
legal ethics, in the 1870s, like Mr. Justice Schroeder, in Can-
ada,4 7 announced a principle, but not a rule. They left truthful
vouching to the tactical judgment and moral deliberation of
lawyers. Atticus Finch and Andrew Hamilton would have had
their approval, no doubt, for putting character on the line in
the Robinson and Zenger cases. Atticus ended his jury speech
saying, "In the name of God, believe Tom Robinson." When
he walked out of the courtroom, the black church in the gallery
stood in tribute to him. Hamilton no doubt put his character
on the line when he told the jury in the Zenger case, "It is the
cause of liberty! .. .[E]very man who prefers freedom to a life
of slavery will bless and honor you, as men who have baffled
the attempt of tyranny."'48 But those were extreme cases. I
suppose that Atticus Finch, Andrew Hamilton, and maybe even
Lord Brougham, accepted the principle that it is usually an
imprudent practice (that is, a practice frowned on by practical
wisdom) to vouch for clients.
These formulations treat vouching for clients under a prin-
ciple, and there is a difference between principles and rules.
The difference is that a rule can only be followed or broken;
principles are more flexible. The traditional place of principles
in legal ethics is that they speak to a lawyer's discretion. Princi-
ples allow consideration of the context of the case. A principle
is one of the circumstances to which a lawyer can bring his
practice of the virtues. It is possible to refuse to follow a princi-
ple and at the same time to honor it. There are cases where
sound morals point to disregarding an otherwise useful
principle.
Shirley Letwin's study of Trollope's characters, many of
them lawyers, illustrates the difference between rules and prin-
ciples. She takes up Kant's dilemma about the murderer pursu-
ing his victim. The victim runs past me and thence out of sight.
The murderer, smoking gun in hand, comes up to me and says,
"Which way did he go?" Kant's rule is that I should not tell a
47. See Schroeder, supra note 24, at 91-92. Schroeder states:
In the ordinary affairs of life an advocate may be taken to be
expressing his own beliefs or his own honestly held convictions, but
not so where he is in the forensic arena. What he says there is not
and is not presumed to be the expression of his own mind.
48. Ronald L. Carlson, Argument to the Jury: Passion, Persuasion, and Legal
Controls, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 787, 793 (1989).
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lie. Letwin says the Trollopian gentleman takes inveterate
truth-telling to be a principle, not a rule: "He will lie to protect
his friend," she says, "but he will not pretend that he has not
lied."49 The principle that would be ignored or honored in
what I am talking about is that, by and large, it is not a good
thing to vouch for clients.
C. The Principle Became the Rule
Rules came to American legal ethics as part of the baggage
of what Durkheim called the "market morality" of the 1870s.50
Market morality produced codes of legal ethics, which at first
mixed principles with rules and have since become rules rather
than principles; it produced the modern bar association; and, in
the codes and through the influence of the bar associations, it
developed the adversary ethic that Wasserstrom characterized
as immoral and Justice Fortas defended: Lawyers should not
accept responsibility for justice; lawyers are not to be held
responsible for what clients do with the advice, or for the legal
relationships the clients enter, or for the freedom of movement
the clients get from lawyers. 5'
As new codes were drafted and old codes revised to con-
form to the adversary ethic, Hoffman's, Sharswood's and
Jones's principle on vouching became a pair of rules: The first
is the rule requiring zeal in advocacy. The second is the rule
against all vouching. This is the form the rule against all
vouching took in the 1908 A.B.A. Canons: "It is improper for a
lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client's
innocence or in the justness of his cause." 52
49. SHIRLEY LETWIN, THE GENTLEMAN IN TROLLOPE: INDIVIDUALITY AND
MORAL CONDUCT 72 (1982).
50. Unsound Adversary Ethic, supra note 27, at 699.
51. Id.
52. The rule, in several forms, is applied in civil and criminal cases and
when a lawyer is speaking to the press about cases in court. The most recent
version of it in the United States is in the A.B.A.'s Rules of Professional
Conduct:
A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... assert personal knowledge of facts
in issue ... or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause,
the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the
guilt or innocence of an accused . . . [nor] make [such] an
extrajudicial statement ... if the lawyer knows ... that it will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding....
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.4 & 3.6 (1992) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. The rule does not apply to lobbying in legislatures or in dis-
ciplinary hearings in which the advocate represents another lawyer who is
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This rule against all vouching appears - but only appears -
to avoid the possibility of deception about the lawyer's opin-
ions, as it appears to focus on the needs of the state and of
lawyer professionalism rather than the formation, preservation,
or protection of character.53 The appearance is that, since an
advocate does not invoke her belief in the truth and justice of
her client's cause, she does not deceive judges and jurors as to
what she believes. One problem with that apparent solution is
that a trial conducted in dependence on such appearances is
deceptive unless the judges and jurors understand what the
advocates are doing. Another problem is the fact that, as Aris-
totle said, the evident character and personal goodness of an
advocate are powerful persuaders; it is impossible not to use
them. Unless the judges and jurors understand that they are
witnessing the performance of a role, they will probably think
that even a lawyer means what she says, even more so when the
content of her performance is persuasive.
Wasserstrom distinguished in this way between a trial law-
yer and an actor:
If the lawyer actually believes everything that he or she
asserts on behalf of the client, then it appears to be
proper to regard the lawyer as in fact embracing and
endorsing the points of view that he or she articulates. If
the lawyer does not in fact believe what is urged by way of
argument ... then it appears to be proper to tax the law-
yer with hypocrisy and'insincerity. To be sure, actors in a
play take on roles and say things that the characters, not
the actors, believe. But we know it is a play .... The law
courts are not ...theaters. . . . [L]awyers talk about
justice.5 4
Because goodness is attractive, evident goodness is, as
Aristotle said, an advocate's most effective means of persua-
sion. An argument is an invitation to share a moral world, even
charged with professional impropriety and may face suspension of his license
to practice law.
53. See Wassertrom, supra note 6. Lawyers who talk about justice, in
Wasserstrom's (and Aristotle's) account, can justify doing so if they believe
the cause is just. On Cicero's account - and in the common justification of
lawyers' market morality - they can talk about justice because, regardless of
what the lawyers say, those who hear lawyers' arguments will arrive at just
decisions. There is a third analysis - Monroe Freedman's - that might say
lawyers may talk about justice because such talk by lawyers is a necessary
condition for their clients' autonomous freedom in a governmental system
based on legal rights. See Freedman, supra note 8.
54. See Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 14.
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to love the things the advocate loves. If the goodness that per-
suades is a pretense, the advocate is a deceiver. Jeffrey Stout
said:
If I am successful [in my arguments] though, it will prob-
ably be because [the person who hears my argument] has
observed me long enough to be taken, despite himself, by
the way I live, to find his loves gradually shifting, irre-
spective of argument, in the direction of mine.... Then,
and only then, are the arguments likely to make a
difference. 55
Ronald Green, in a debate with Stout, during the 1990 meeting
of the Society of Christian Ethics, said, "Such a view would
consign to the trash heap most of our written tradition of moral
philosophy."56 But a trial lawyer may have to reply that charac-
ter persuades, that, as Samuel Butler said: "We are not won by
arguments that we can analyze but by tone and temper, by the
manner which is the man himself." '57 Moral standards for
advocacy, perhaps unlike moral standards for arguments in
moral philosophy, take "the manner which is the man himself"
into account - not as the norm, but as inevitable. For that
reason, the modem rule against all vouching for clients does
not avoid or answer the charge that advocacy pursued accord-
ing to the rule requiring zeal is a deceptive enterprise.
III. LAWYERS' USE OF THE RULE AGAINST
VOUCHING
The rule against all vouching for clients took form at the
turn of the century. Between then and now lawyers have
argued about the rule and, more indicatively, they have used it
as a weapon. There have been, for example, dozens of cases in
which improper vouching during trials was made a ground for
appeal to higher courts.58
55. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS
AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 258-59 (1988); see also Jerry Frug, Argument as
Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988).
56. Roland M. Green, Jeffrey Stout's "Ethics After Babel": A Critical
Appraisal, ANN. SOC'Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS, 1990, at 31.
57. THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 193 (Robert
Andrews ed. 1990).
58. See Carlson, supra note 48. See generally United States v. Bowie, 892
F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
1989); United States v. Hernandez, 891 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Phillips, 527
F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1975).
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A New York lawyer who was also a priest decided that
effective advocacy required him to wear his clerical collar in
court. His duty was perhaps suggested to him by a case in Ten-
nessee which involved a lawyer who could cry at will. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court said: "If counsel has [tears] at
command, it may be seriously questioned whether it is not his
professional duty to shed them whenever proper occasion
arises."59 The New York lawyer thought the principle applied
as well to lawyers who have emblems of clerical status at com-
mand, but the New York judges held against him and made an
unfortunate distinction between the two professions: They
feared jurors would "ascribe a greater measure of veracity and
personal commitment" to the words of a priest than to the
words of a lawyer.60 One can interpret this to mean that, so far
as the law is concerned, the clergy are free to vouch for their
clients but lawyers are not.
Most of the cases involve words rather than collars or
tears. A prosecutor may, according to the federal courts of
appeal, say, "I believe the evidence has shown the defendant's
guilt," but may not say, "I believe the defendant is guilty."
Appeals from drug convictions indicate that although prosecu-
tors may suggest to the jury that a witness who testifies as a
result of a deal with the government can be expected to tell the
truth, they may not suggest that disbelieving a government wit-
ness supports the inference that prosecutors contrived false
testimony. The latter, according to the federal court of appeals
in Chicago, would be "vouching to the utmost degree. "61
When a federal prosecutor said to the jury, "We don't take
liars. We don't put liars on the stand. We don't do that," the
appellate court said his behavior required "reversal per se. "62
Prosecutors may not suggest that their experience leads
them - and should therefore lead the jurors - to place unu-
sual weight on the evidence from which they are arguing, but
they get away with hyperbolic statements of horror at the
offenses charged. Clarence Darrow once told a jury:
I have never yet tried a case where the state's attorney did
not say that it was the most cold-blooded, inexcusable,
premeditated case that ever occurred. If it was murder,
there was never such a murder. If it was robbery, there
never was such a robbery. If it was a conspiracy, it was
59. Ferguson v. Moore, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (Tenn. 1897).
60. LaRocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606, 613 (N.Y. 1975).
61. Phillips, 527 F.2d at 1025.
62. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999.
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the most terrible conspiracy that ever happened since the
star-chamber .... 63
A. Use Turns on Form
I generalize from cases such as these that the rule is a rule
of form. Indicative statements are almost always all right. The
way to comply is to avoid first-person pronouns. The rule does
not prohibit opinionated and even inflammatory statement. In
the murder trial of FrankJames, Jesse's brother, the prosecutor
got away with saying, "if all the innocent blood he has caused
to go unavenged were collected in some vast reservoir, [the
judge] might swim in it."' James, the prosecutor said, "set at
naught the laws of his country . . . and bathed his hands in
human blood."6 5 This lawyer used indicative statements; he
did not use first-person pronouns.
The Iowa Supreme Court once said that flamboyant
speeches in court are part of American culture: "They give zest
and point to the declamation, relieve the tediousness of the
juror's duties, and please the audience .... ",66 Another and
more solemn judicial theory, from the Missouri Reports, said
extravagant speech is a means to truth: "[I]llustrations may be
as various as the resources ... of ... genius .... Forensic strife
is but the method - and a mighty one - to ascertain the truth
"67
Darrow was famous for using windows of opportunity in
trials to argue broad social issues instead of the facts of the case
he was defending. "I don't care how often [labor unions] fail,"
Darrow said in his defense of Bill Haywood, or "how many bru-
talities they are guilty of. I know their cause is just. '"68
B. Zeal Means Giving Your Client the Benefit of Your Doubt
To conclude from such examples that the rules don't work
would not be to say lawyers can't follow them. A rule can be
63. See Carlson, supra note 48, at 800. Darrow's jury speeches,
including this one, are compiled at some length id. at 797-802. If the
examples he quoted amounted to vouching - and they probably did not -
most of them would have been excused under a rule that permits what judges
call justifiable retaliation. Id. at 819.
64. Id. at 796.
65. Id. at 797.
66. State v. Burns, 94 N.W. 238, 241 (Iowa 1903).
67. Evans v. Town of Trenton, 20 S.W. 614, 616 (Mo. 1892).
68. Carlson, supra note 48, at 799. Darrow was not referring to the
cause that was being tried - Haywood's guilt. That would have offended the
rule against vouching.
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trivial without being troublesome. In a relatively righteous
array of examples, lawyers who limit what they say to what they
believe are usually able to follow in good conscience the rule
that forbids all vouching for clients. They need not worry
about deception and, since character rather than form makes
the argument, they develop a knack for satisfying the formal
rule: A careful speaker can avoid personal pronouns; the script
writers on "L.A. Law" often do it by having the lawyer say, "My
client believes" in place of "I believe."
The truthful advocate has more difficulty with the rule
requiring zeal, first because that rule's demand on the truthful
advocate is that she be "professional," and, second, because
the demand she consequently makes on herself, as a person
who thinks of herself as truthful, is that she believe in her cli-
ent's cause. The operating morality of zealous advocacy for
such a truthful advocate then requires her to give her client the
benefit of a doubt, because a lawyer cannot function profes-
sionally if she demands pervasive certainty of truth and justice
from every client who employs her. As one trial lawyer put it to
me, "You can almost always find something you believe in."
With significant support from the psycho-dynamics of competi-
tion, lawyers persuade themselves that it is not possible to
know who is telling the truth or what outcome will bejust. This
reasoning (or, if you like, self-deception) gains support from
the systemic consideration that the alternative would be to limit
advocacy to cases a lawyer can believe in without according cli-
ents the benefit of a doubt, and that limitation would not be
professional.69
But benefit-of-a-doubt as a procedure is not as much moral
help as it might appear to be. The practice, reinforced in
rivalry and by the inclination to believe people who are paying
you to help them, seems likely to lead to self-deception.7 ° I
suspect that reliance on benefit-of-a-doubt, as much as reliance
on the role morality Wasserstrom described, 7' accounts for the
impression we legal academics have from our alumni and
friends that trial lawyers burn out young or turn to substance
abuse. Those who defend drug dealers become cynics, and
those who represent bankers become like their clients.
69. Freedman, supra note 8, and other sources cited therein, makes this
argument.
70. The classic study of self-deception is HERBERT FINGARETFE, SELF
DECEPrION (1969). I attempt to apply it, with considerable help from
STANLEY HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY (1977), to lawyers, in
AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 21, ch. 7.
71. See Wasserstrom, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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An alternative is to maintain truthfulness by a selective use
of the rule requiring zeal. Selective application of zeal is, accord-
ing to the rules, as unprofessional as the demand for pervasive
truth and justice, but it has a better pedigree. David Hoffman
resolved, he said in 1836, that, when he was persuaded that a
client accused of serious crime was guilty,
I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to
use my endeavors to arrest, or to impede the course of
justice, by special resorts to ingenuity - to artifices of
eloquence - to appeals to the morbid and fleeting sym-
pathies of weak juries, or of temporizing courts - to my
own personal weight of character - nor.. . to any of the
. .. influences I may possess. . . .Persons of atrocious
character . .. are entitled to :no such special exertions
from any member of our pure and honourable profes-
sion; and indeed, to no intervention beyond securing to
them a fair and dispassionated investigation of the facts
of their cause, and the due application of the law; all that
goes beyond this . . .sets a higher value on professional
display and success, than on truth and justice, and the
substantial interests of the community.72
George Sharswood, a generation closer to the robber bar-
ons, was ambivalent, but he agreed with what Charles Phillips
said in defending his advocacy for Courvoisier - that advocacy
in such a case should be limited to arguments arising on the
evidence. 73 "You are not necessarily married to the client,"
one trial lawyer said to me. Another said, "You can adequately
represent your client and at the same time convey to the trier of
fact that your client is a sleaze bag." And a third said, "Why is
hoping to win important? Every time you walk into a court,
somebody loses."
Hoffman said he was selective about zeal because he was
concerned for people who were not in court. He was like a
colleague of mine who commented onmy arguing for the
release from prison of a man who had been convicted of raping
a child. My colleague said, "If you get him out, I hope he
moves in next door to you." Hoffman was a republican lawyer;
he believed lawyers were responsible for justice. If lawyers are
responsible for justice, their clients must either be right or be
made by their lawyers to do right. 4
72. HOFFMAN, supra note 43, at 755, 756.
73. Sharswood, supra note 31.
74. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican
Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673 (1979). Hoffman was less concerned about
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The unguarded remarks I quote from my friends may
reflect a similar concern for third persons, but they also suggest
personal revulsion at the person being represented. This dis-
taste is not Jeffersonian elitism; it seems to be the reaction that
upright people have as they want to distance themselves from
the deviant. I have argued that this reaction is like the one
Jesus provoked from his Pharisaic colleagues when he dined
with counterparts of modern Mafia dons: In St. Luke's
account, the critics said, "this man receiveth sinners, and eateth
with them," and Jesus responded with the parable of the lost
sheep.75 Modern, role-morality professional ethics has its own
way to preserve the distance Jesus refused to observe and at the
same time be "professional." An advocate can separate his
performance as advocate from his character as moral agent, if
he is willing to protect his purity at his client's expense.
But you can almost hear the client of the second trial law-
yer I talked to saying, "You could at least pretend I am not a
sleaze bag"; there otherwise seems to be little service to a client
in such selective advocacy. There is, of course, a "profes-
sional" response to such a demand for service, from such a cli-
ent; it is suggested in an annotation in the American Law Reports:
It is ethical for a member of the bar to represent the
accused even if he knows the latter to be guilty. In fact, it
may be on occasion an ethical duty to do so .... [How-
ever], [t]here are certain inherent limitations .... There
must be no relationship between them except purely that
of attorney and client. . . . Counsel is not expected to
stultify himself in an attempt to advance his client's inter-
ests. The attorney is justified in withdrawing, where, dur-
ing the progress of the litigation, the client engages in
conduct that tends to degrade or humiliate the
attorney.76
The rule requiring zeal means at least that my friend may
not say that his client is a sleaze bag. A lawyer who did that
would not provide adequate representation, and he would also
commit legal malpractice. One way to avoid such professional
and legal disapproval is to attempt no personal relationship
with his client and to use the arts of rhetoric with the jury. If
equality than most of his professional descendants have been, and he was
relatively unconcerned about autonomy.
75. Luke 15 (King James); see also AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
21, ch. 5.
76. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Rights and Duties of Attorney in a
Criminal Prosecution Where Client Informs Him of Intention to Present Perjured
Testimony, 64 A.L.R. 3d 385, 387 (1975).
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Jeffrey Stout, and Samuel Butler are right, these arts nonethe-
less, and unavoidably, include creating the impression that the
lawyer's character is on the line, since the rule requiring zealous
advocacy mandates a lawyer's giving that impression. Nine-
teenth-century lawyers worried that such arts were untruthful;
modern discussion of them centers in analysis of statements,
rather than in the habits and dispositions that make it possible
to be both a good person and a good lawyer, or in concern for
what decision makers think is going on.
The case reports and commentators demonstrate, I think,
how the modern analytical procedure leads to sophistry in the
law and to cynicism in its practice. The analytical alternative
has also been damaging to ethical reflection. It has suppressed
among legal ethicists what might otherwise have become
descriptions of the relationships lawyers have with their clients,
their colleagues, and those before whom they present advo-
cacy. The profession and its teachers fasten on rules for using
pronouns while they neglect description of the character neces-
sary to being a lawyer in the late twentieth century in North
America and the development of professional communities that
are able to form lawyers in the virtues necessary for the practice
of law.7 7
IV. AN ARISTOTELIAN ETHICAL PROSPECT FOR
ADVOCATES 78
A. Benevolence and Meaning What You Say
The way to avoid pretense in advocacy is to say what you
mean and to mean both what you say and what you seem to
mean in what you say and do. We come to mean what we say
about the subjects and the objects of our advocacy - the peo-
ple involved, rather than the words - by approaching them
with benevolence. We are then, in the ordinary meaning of the
word,friendly, rather than either self-deceived or cynical, as we
weigh the stories and claims of our clients and make or seem to
77. A subject that is developed in a more positive way in THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES
(1991) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAWYERS].
78. I doubt that the argument that follows can be made from the
RHETORIC, supra note 1, which seems uncharacteristically cynical, unless one
puts great weight on the uncharacteristic claim that the advocate's worthy
end excuses abusive means. In any event, I depend here mostly on the
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4, the MAGNA MORALIA, supra note 4, and on
the secondary sources, supra note 5.
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make a decision about whether to accord them the benefit of a
doubt.
This alternative appeals to friendship not as a bit of good
luck, or even as a way to describe a relationship, but (1) as habit
or disposition that rests on the understandings that (2) friend-
ship is constituent of the good life and not merely a consequence
of it;79 and (3) the claim that practice of the virtue of friendship
is in significant part an exercise of will. Will Rogers and Har-
vey's friend, Elwood P. Dowd, described the disposition -
Rogers when he said he never met a man he didn't like, Dowd
when he said: "Dr. Chumley, my mother used to say to me, 'In
this world, Elwood . . . you must be oh, so smart or oh, so
pleasant.' For years I was smart. I recommend pleasant. You
may quote me. ''8
Beyond disposition and habit, this is to understand friend-
ship as (4) dynamic: Aristotle's "lesser forms of friendship,"
friendships that are pursued for pleasure or for profit, are,
when pursued with benevolence, the beginning of and the
means to the friendship that is a collaboration in the good.
The relatively instrumental relationships an advocate has with
the people she meets in "the administration ofjustice," and the
relationships for profit she has with her clients, are, when pur-
sued with benevolence, an initiation to the practice of friend-
ship as collaboration in the good.
This earthy, Aristotelian account of the process of friend-
ship is a radical warning against our modem tendency to sepa-
rate our friends from those we work with and work for. The
tendency to treat our friendships, as we treat our religion, as
79. See Cooper, supra note 5.
80. MARY CHASE, HARVEY (1952). Aristotle speaks of friendliness as an
aspect of truthfulness: "[I]t has to do with acts and words," and, as virtue, is
the middle way between flattery and hostility - the excess going beyond the
truth and the deficiency detracting from the truth. MAGNA MORALIA, supra
note 4, at 20-28. I mean to discuss benevolence, which Aristotle treats under
the virtue of friendship - "love toward things with life . . . where there can
be a return of affection." Id. at 35. He speaks of benevolence as "good will
*.. the beginning of friendship," the wish and the power to do good "for the
sake of the person towards whom good will is felt." Id. at 8-9. The virtue, or
beginning of virtue, that is described here, particularly with reference to
truthfulness, is often made about relationships among lawyers - although
there it may more often invoke an organic metaphor and be called fraternity.
See, e.g., Valleyfield Constr. v. Argo Constr., 7 C.P.C. 60 (Ontario High Court
of Justice, 1978)(Linden, J.): "The word of a solicitor is viewed by another
solicitor as virtually sacred .... Lawyers generally have always done what
they said they would do .... Thus, real estate transactions worth millions of
dollars are closed and title passed on the basis of the word of another
solicitor." Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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private, denies to us the benefit of sharing with friends most of
what we do most of the time. "Professionalism" discourages
the practice of benevolence with most of the people we deal
with, most of the time and with the most intensity."' Deprived
thus of friendship as support for moral reasoning in profes-
sional life, we turn to conditions of loneliness and the ethical
processes of (depersonalized) analysis of words and acts.
Friendship as dynamic, as a process, means that the benev-
olent disposition Cooper 2 translates literally as "wishing well"
- I risk calling it "friendliness" - is common to friendships
for profit and friendships that are collaborations in the good.
It is prior to the relationship a person has with any particular
friend, but it grows in the soil of other, including lesser, friend-
ships. Mostly, I think, the skill of friendship grows in the
organic friendships we first have in family, town, and religious
congregation. It is in those organic beginnings that we are
formed in the ability to be friends. Stanley Hauerwas speaks of
constancy in friendship as dependent on constancy to self;" I
want to add to his insight that it is in the organic relationships
- the relationships we do not choose - that we learn what con-
stancy to self is and what is required to maintain it.
It is possible to assign particular moral weight to an advo-
cate's friendliness toward her client - because it grows - it
has begun to grow - in the soil of a lesser friendship.8 4 One
who makes such an Aristotelian argument, though, should be
prepared to admit its risks. The most prominent of these is the
risk of suffering. Friendship presupposes vulnerability.
Friendliness in the practice of an arcane, contentious, perilous
occupation is often an invitation to pain. This is particularly
true, as Emily Hartigan has pointed out, of friendliness in the
81. Although, the notion of "professionalism" seems sometimes to
invoke, or at least depend upon, deeper notions of friendship. See Thomas L.
Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 406-
09 (1990).
82. Cooper; supra note 5, at 632.
83. See Hauerwas supra note 5; Stanley Hauerwas, Constancy and
Forgiveness: The Novel as a School for Virtue, 15 NOTRE DAME ENG. J. 23, 26-27
(1983).
84. Book Eight of the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4, talks of
friendship. Aristotle said that good people are made through participation in
a common activity which is worthwhile in and of itself. The practice of law
seems to be worthwhile, as any occupation that calls itself a profession does,
by reason of the facts that (i) it deals with matters of importance to persons
and communities, and (ii) it has been, by client and community, (iii) assigned
in a significant (enfranchised) way to persons who are learned in its traditions
and its art.
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law.85 Vulnerability is the determination not to treat those who
listen to advocacy, or clients, or potential clients, as instru-
ments. It is vulnerability that makes it possible to practice
benevolence toward such people, to wish them well, to take an
interest in them.86
B. The Aristotelian Alternative in the Anthropology of
American Lawyers
Friendship can describe the usual relationship a lawyer has
with her clients and can extend to a disposition toward col-
leagues, witnesses, judges, and jurors. (The opposite sequence
seems to risk the republican elitism that modern lawyers dislike
in the legal ethics of David Hoffman.) Friendship consistently
shows up in legal ethics, although the tradition has also been
consistently distorted by abstract statements of principle and
rule, and by recurrent obsessions with objectivity - from Hoff-
man's pompous elitism to the American Bar Association's post-
Watergate campaign for "professionalism." With, I hope, the
possibility of Aristotle looking over my shoulder, I suggest
three examples of friendship from the anthropology of Ameri-
can lawyers.
There is, first, the advertent limitation of advocacy to those
who are already what Aristotle would call "true" friends. Wil-
liam Kunstler said, at the height of the anti-war movement of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, that he would not have a client
he did not love.8 7 Once you get over being startled at the lack
of "professionalism" in that sentiment, you notice that what
lies at the base of it is the discovery that justice is not enough.
Not only, as Aristotle said, do friends have no need ofjustice, a
but justice is oppressive when it is not softened by the other
virtues.8 9
85. Emily F. Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as
Invitation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67 (1991).
86. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 11-14. He demonstrates that not being
cruel is not enough - a significant argument for codified legal-ethics rules on
treatment of persons other than a lawyer's clients. As to clients, White says
that the object of the professional enterprise is truth, and the method is
friendship. See WHITE, supra note 2. I have suggested that the object is
friendship, and the method is truth. Friends do not lie to one another, and
friendly people do not approach one another with lies. I suspect White's
formulation, like mine, would preclude rules against vouching for clients, as
both preclude pretending to vouch for clients. See FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS, supra note 5, ch. 6.
87. See AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 21, at 570.
88. See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4.
89. The problem with Kuntsler's undertaking is that it does not seem to
VOUCHING FOR CLIENTS
A second piece of anthropology is the practice of advocacy
among cronies - among clients who are cronies or cronies of
cronies - and advocacy beside, against, and directed toward
cronies. I think here of the law practice of George V. Higgins's
Boston-Irish lawyers, particularly Jeremiah Francis Kennedy. °"
Jerry Kennedy's practice turns on doing favors and collecting
on favors done. It rests on the sort of friendship that provides
profit, but the virtue of friendship can flourish there. Kierke-
gaard said it always begins there.9 ' Jerry Kennedy profits from
the fees paid him by Cadillac Teddy Franklin, designer car
thief. Toward the end of fifteen years of mutual profit, their
relationship has become a collaboration in the good. Their
work together has come to the place where Jerry tries to keep
Teddy from stealing cars, and Teddy encourages Jerry to be a
truthful advocate. Jerry takes fees from clients who are his cro-
nies and clients who are not, but - as Teddy Franklin tells him
- he does his best work for his cronies. I regret to report that
Jerry vouches for his clients, but that is not uncommon among
lawyers who have friends for clients or clients for friends. As
for Jerry's advocacy in court, which is only necessary when
favors fail, Jerry's friends tell him that he's better when he
means it.
9 2
Finally, there is the anthropology of the late immigrants, those
who began to come to the American legal profession less than a
century ago. Their children and grandchildren have come to
law school and into a male W.A.S.P. fraternity that imposes
regulatory rules, such as the rule requiring zeal in advocacy and
the rule against all vouching for clients, but they have not
allowed those rules to become an ethic. They obey the rules as
they obey traffic lights, and for about the same reasons. Their
comprehend friendship as dynamic. It does not allow for the possibility that
friendship begins in relationships for pleasure and profit. Jack Lee Sammons,
Jr., suggested to me that advocacy as friendship helps resolve the problem of
vouching in a more comprehensive way:
I don't think it is hypocritical to speak for a friend, even to do so in a
powerful way for a friend you disagree with .... Kuntsler doesn't
love enough - he doesn't have enough friends and potential
friends. He is not like Elwood P. Dowd .... I think of his friends as
comrades. We don't need something called lawyers if we are just
going to choose up sides.
90. See GEORGE V. HIGGINS, KENNEDY FOR THE DEFENSE (1980); GEORGE
V. HIGGINS, PENANCE FOR JERRY KENNEDY (1985); GEORGE V. HIGGINS,
DEFENDING BILLY RYAN (1992).
91. See MEILAENDER, supra note 5, at 53-63.
92. See Good Client, supra note 8; see also Schneyer, supra note 7, at 1002
(documents several examples in the white-collar criminal-defense bar).
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ethic is familial; the Southern-Italian immigrants called it the
order of the family, la via vecchia, the old way. The Puritan
phrase for it is "amoral familism."
Mary M. Shaffer and I have attempted to demonstrate else-
where that, as l'ordine dellafamiglia found its way into American-
lawyer professionalism, the familial was applied outside the
family - first to people from the same place in the Old World,
then to people from the same region, then to people from the
same nation-state, then to those a modem American "profes-
sional" person meets in her work. 3 The advantage this
anthropology develops, as contrasted with practice among cro-
nies, is that the moral boundaries of the familial (which reach
beyond friendship for pleasure and profit more than relation-
ships among cronies do) are expanded in reference to and
respect for the familial. This becomes an instance of the prac-
tice in professional life of the virtue of friendship as we have
learned it in the family. (It even sometimes justifies the use of
familial metaphors by people in a profession.) If, for example,
there is hope that a group of lawyers can become what Alasdair
MacIntyre calls a "practice," 4 it is because a professional com-
munity can take advantage of this organic formation in
friendship.95
93. See AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 77, ch. 6 & 7 (Italian Americans);
AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 21, ch. 12 (Italians and other late
immigrants, including Eastern European Jews).- In the case of the Italian
immigrants, the development was an American development; most of these
immigrants did not think of themselves as Italians when they were in Italy.
94. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 175-83 (1982).
95. All three of these anthropologies depend on communities that are
more powerful and more sustaining than any professional fraternity in
America has been able to be - and more powerful, too, than the rather too
cool, too masculine "practice." Id. The influence of the community behind a
position such as Kuntsler's is hard to see, not because the community is not
there, but because the context of argument in anti-war protest, brought to
courtrooms, was described by a democratic liberalism that knows no
communities except the ones produced by choice. See Donald L. Gelpi, S.J.,
Conversion: Beyond the Impasses of Individualism, in BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM:
TOWARD A RETRIEVAL OF MORAL DISCOURSE IN AMERICA 1 (Donald L. Gelpi,
S.J. ed. 1989); Betty Mensch & Alan Freeman, Liberalism's Public/Private Split,
TIKKUN, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 24; Stephen Pope, Expressive Individualism and True
Self-Love: A Thomistic Perspective, 71 J. RELIGION 385 (1991).
Higgins's stories, on the other hand, and, even more, l'ordine dellafamiglia
of the late immigrants, are driven by a tension between the American civic
community and the organic communities that teach a lawyer what friendship
is. See AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 77, ch. 5. These organic communities
in America have been in significant ways religious. The argument I make
here, in Aristotelian terms, depends in a similar way on sustaining organic
(and religious) communities. ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, supra note 14, ch. 8 &
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Zeal for a client's interest is not inconsistent with friend-
ship, but zeal plays out differently with a friend because interest
is worked out differently. "Client interest" is a prominent
notion in codified American legal ethics, where it seems to
mean either the purposes stated by a lawyer's client when he
comes to a lawyer, or (more often and more dismally) the pur-
poses a lawyer supposes, without asking, that his client has or
should have in view. "Client interest" is not a given, in either
of these ways, when your client is your friend. It is then, at
first, not so much a purpose as it is a project. Friends decide
together what their common interests are and only then decide
what each of their interests are. Friends collaborate in the
good; if the interest one of them claims is not consistent with
collaboration in the good, friends, who have a stake in one
another's character, collaborate in what Karl Barth called con-
ditional advice.96 (Aquinas called it fraternal correction.) It is
not that the lawyer's professional task is to see to it that her
client does the right thing; it is that two friends are mutually
concerned that both of them be and become good persons. 9 '
ch. 1-4. These sustaining communities are where a person is formed in the
accepting (Romans 14:1) and in the burden (Romans 15:1) that friendship
entails.
96. KARL BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS 14 (Edwyn C. Hoskyns
trans., 6th ed. 1968).
97. I am grateful for the assistance of Joseph Allegretti, Harlan R.
Beckley, Frank E. Booker, Louis M. Brown, Thomas Dixon, Fernand N.
Dutile, Ronald Green, Linda Harrington, Emily Hartigan, Stanley Hauerwas,
Linda R. Hirshman, Louis W. Hodges, L. Gregory Jones, Duane C. LaRue,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Robert S. Redmount, John Robinson, Robert E.
Rodes, Jr., Gary Rosenshield, Jack Lee Sammons, Jr., Theodore J. Schneyer,
James H. Seckinger, Daniel P. Semmens, and NancyJ. Shaffer. Publication of
an earlier version of this paper was planned in a new journal, to have been
founded and edited by the late Professor Warren Lehman, of the University
of Wisconsin. He died before his interesting new intellectual adventure
could begin, but he spent many long hours on this paper; I dedicate my
efforts to his memory.
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